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1 Introduction 
Medical phenomenology has been successful in pointing out the typical 
components of illnesses, despite their acknowledged diversity, their 
cultural variations, and the normativism often entailed by the holistic 
theories of health. Two theoretical results have made possible the 
developments of this general approach. First, the formulation of the 
paradigm of the lived body (TOOMBS, 1992, 1988; CAREL, 2016), which 
allowed for the interpretation of chronic somatic illness, for example, as the 
experience of disruptive changes in the structures of bodily schema, of 
social and motor intentionality, and of the unity of organic and lived body. 
Second, the notion of affective intentionality offers an explanatory 
framework for a special class of non-conceptual, bodily feelings that 
structure the intentional experience in general, namely, existential feelings 
(RATCLIFFE, 2005, 2008 e 2015). Thus, the experience of illness has been 
presented as an atmosphere of uncanniness or unhomelikeness 
(SVENAUES, 2000a, 2000b; CAREL, 2016). On the one hand, in illnesses 
there would be a structural perturbation in the domain of existential 
feelings, which would bring about a world opening characterized by 
uncanniness. The ill body would be experienced as a broken-tool, which can 
lead to the feeling of unhomelikeness. On the other hand, that atmosphere 
correlates with an ontological trait of human existence, i.e. the presence of 
something alien to competent existential capacities: vulnerability and 
fragility of the lived body.   
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My goal here is to examine some of the details of that result in the 
general phenomenology of illness. My specific purpose is to suggest that 
there is evidence against conceiving – even analogically – the ill body as a 
broken-tool: during illness there is a perturbation of the more basic 
existential feelings that renders apparent not the body as a broken tool, but 
a much more complex ontological structure. Such structure is made up of 
classes of possibilities, which in turn make up a modal unity of ways of 
being, i.e. historical existence and organic life. This is no small ontological 
commitment. Quite the contrary: it demands adopting a robust ontological 
and epistemological framework. This becomes evident when one considers 
that the form of generality relation entailed by those modes is impermeable 
to the usual procedures of conceptual analysis and definition. By 
highlighting those points, I intend to suggest that the general 
phenomenology of illness can be furthered by the adoption of a framework 
that is friendly to ontological pluralism and to the theory of forms of 
generality. Naturally, the consequences of this movement to applied 
phenomenology and to qualitative research methodologies in the health 
sciences are not negligible. 
2. The atmosphere of illness and the body-tool 
In medical phenomenology, illness is not elucidated in biostatistical 
terms (BOORSE, 1975), but as a disruption in the lived body experienced as 
a set of losses. Those losses are presented as the typical features of the 
illness: loss of wholeness, loss of certainty, loss of control, loss of freedom 
to act, loss of the familiar world (TOOMBS, 1987, 1992; CAREL, 2016). A 
more general trait of the illness experience is conveyed by the concept of 
uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit). In illness, the disruptions experienced in the 
lived body highlight the structural uncanniness of human existence, insofar 
as the losses one undergoes bring about an uncanny encounter with one’s 
own body. It is the lived body which then appears as uncanny, and as such 
it shows itself as a broken-tool, that is, it shows itself as dysfunctional and 
obtrusive.  
The elucidation of the dynamics of the illness experience by analogy to 
the dynamics of the perturbations in the use of tools is common in medical 
phenomenology. On the basis of Heidegger’s well-known analysis of the 
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as having the dynamics of a dysfunctional appearance of bodilyness, which 
shows itself obstinately and urgently as something merely subsistent 
(RAWLINSON, 1982, p. 75; LEDER, 1990, pp. 19, 33 e 83-84; TOOMBS, 1988, 
p. 225, n. 82; 1992, p. 136, n. 7). This analysis is explicitly analogical. In 
illness, the interruption of adequate functioning shows the body as having 
a nature analogous to that of a machine, which conveys the instrumentality 
of a body permeated by physical processes that can neither be experienced 
nor controlled by the person affected (TOOMBS 1988, p. 216; 1992, p. 91). 
Havi Carel (2015) refined that analysis by submitting the analogy 
between illness and instrumental dysfunction to two conditions. First, the 
analogy holds only for the dynamics of the phenomenal manifestation of 
the ill body. As with functional tools, also a healthy body has some 
unconspicuousness. Ill bodies, as well as dysfunctional tools, can show 
themselves obtrusive, obstinate, and conspicuous. Second, the analogy 
seems to hold only under the condition that the body be regarded 
objectively as a physiological material machine. In this case, organs and 
parts of the body may be viewed as tools, and during illness they can be 
conceived as broken-tools. However, in a crucial sense the body is not a 
tool, because the living body is the medium for having a world, the locus 
and the origin of the existential feeling of being in the world. Therefore, a 
dysfunctional change in the body happens in way that is more profound 
and different from a tool breakdown (CAREL, 2015, pp. 120-121). However, 
although the body is not a tool, Carel maintains that the analogy between 
tool and bodily breakdowns still holds (2015, p. 122). Thus, illness 
represents a painful and powerful way of rendering present the intrinsically 
corporal constitution of human existence (CAREL, 2011, p. 40; 2015, p. 121).  
Fredrik Svenaues made a conceptually more substantial move by not 
limiting the comparison between tool and bodily breakdowns to analogical 
procedures. On the contrary, he claimed that there is no valid argument for 
restricting the Heideggerian concept of tools to things outside the human 
body (SVENAEUS, 2000b, p. 130). Hence, the category of tool could be 
generalized so as to subsume both the class of tools belonging to the world 
and those belonging to the self. Body-tools are those parts of the lived body 
that belong both to the projective power and to the meaning formation of 
the self. The demarcation between the two would not be the boundary 
limiting of the surface of biologicals organisms, but the belonging to a 
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transcendence, integrating the set of meaning-constitutive structures. 
Illness, then, can be presented as a unhomelikeness in the corporal structure 
of world formation, as a breakdown in the tool-structure relating to the self 
(SVENAEUS, 2000b, p. 131). Note that this interpretation satisfies a 
conceptual requirement for the use of the notion of uncanniness, because it 
captures not only the uncanniness atmosphere, but also that the body itself 
is lived in an ambiguous way, as something both familiar and strange. The 
ill body is still one’s own, but it is lived as alien, involving biological 
processes beyond one’s control, presenting itself in an obtrusive and 
merciless way (ibidem).  
This general result of the phenomenology of illness has been the target 
of an important criticism. Andrew Warsop discussed its central point, 
namely, the link between the phenomenon of uncanniness and the notion 
of broken-tool. He argued that although in some circumstances it might be 
useful to understand the lived body as a tool, and that although the body 
does appear uncanny during illness, the uncanniness atmosphere is not due 
to the presence of the body as a broken-tool, but to the fragility and 
mortality of organic bodies (WARSOP 2011, pp. 489 e 494).  
In what follows, I will narrow my focus so as to make apparent the 
inadequacy of the interpretation of illness based on the notion of broken-
tool.   
3. Bodily doubt and vulnerability 
One of the main aspects of the illness experience in a number of mental 
and somatic disorders is a disruption in the basic sense of bodily trust. That 
disruption is lived as a feeling of bodily doubt (CAREL, 2016 e 2014), which 
operates at the corporal, not at the doxastic level, and is properly described 
as a bodily feeling. Despite manifesting itself at various degrees of intensity 
and duration, bodily doubts do have some common traits: they may begin 
suddenly or gradually, can become pervasive in everyday life, may relate 
to parts of the body or to the whole body. At a structural level, bodily 
doubts consist in radical changes in the experience of the body, involving 
three kinds of losses: loss of continuity, of transparency, and of trust in one’s 
own body. An important outcome of the analysis of bodily doubt lies in the 








178 ANALYTICA, Rio de Janeiro, vol 22 nº 2, 2018, p. 174-191 https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.2018.v22i2.174-191 
ROBSON REIS  
conditions one’s relation with the body and the world. In bodily doubts the 
tacit presence of bodily certainty manifests itself in a perturbed way.  
Trusting that the body will go on working as it usually does makes up 
an operative background for actions and projects. This is a tacit and non-
conscious certainty, not a propositional attitude, but rather a feeling. The 
feeling of bodily certainty has a phenomenology, which consists of feeling 
self-confident, familiar, able to perform what one is doing. Furthermore, 
bodily certainty belongs to the category of bodily feelings. Based on the 
analysis by Collombetti and Ratcliffe (2012; GALLAGHER & ZAHAVI, 
2008; LEGRAND, 2007), bodily certainty can be described as a noematic, 
preattentive, reflex-like bodily feeling: the feeling of being able, that is, a 
tacit feeling of trust (CAREL, 2014, pp. 149-150). 
In order to present a concept of bodily trust that is adequate for 
interpreting the experience of illness on the basis of bodily doubt, Carel 
makes use of a general elucidation of the phenomenon of trust. In the 
context of an analysis of the formation and acknowledgment of oneself and 
others as worthy and valuable, Bernstein (2011) presents trust as 
intrinsically tacit and non-optional. Withdrawing from attention in favor of 
the interactions that it allows for, trust is not primarily a cognitive attitude. 
It does not result from a rational installation, although it is subject to 
rational corrections. Even before someone reaches the standpoint of reason, 
trust must independently emerge and guide one’s relations to others.   
This precedence of trust relative to reason, on the other hand, is not 
merely logical or psychological, but also developmental. Bernstein (2011, 
pp. 407-414) describes a complex developmental sequence, in which the 
sense of relative independence and of oneself and others as valuable and 
worthy results from mimetic exchanges, complex attitudes in the 
socialization process, and the construction of normative areas. We do not 
need to dwell any further on this description; it suffices to say that it aims 
at justifying the claim that adult trust is a contingent and developmental 
outcome based on infant trust, in other words: adult trust formation is the 
learning of distrust (BERNSTEIN, 2011, p. 406). In short, trust is primarily a 
non-cognitive attitude that allows for the appearance of more complex 
phenomena, such as the acknowledgement of others as persons. The 
understanding of trust as a response required by the problem posited by 
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trust “is accepted vulnerability to another’s possible but not expected will 
(or lack of good will) toward one.” (BAIER, 1995, p. 99).  
Naturally, the phenomenon of trust displays dense layers of certainties 
and particular kinds of trust (KUSCH & RATCLIFFE, 2018, p. 73). Bodily 
trust is situated in a multifaceted complex of trust in one’s parents, 
caretakers, action environments, institutions, persons one depends on, etc. 
Although Havi Carel does not offer an analysis of bodily trust in a 
developmental setting, one can speculate whether the development of 
bodily trust would follow a sequence analogous to that of adult trust. It is 
plausible to conjecture, for example, that bodily trust might build up 
through a process of socialization that may allow us to conclude that – much 
like persons (BAIER, 1995, p. 84) – bodies are second bodies. It is crucial, 
however, that bodily trust be analyzed not as a propositional attitude, but 
rather as a powerful bodily feeling that has a weak epistemic status 
(CAREL, 2014, pp. 146 e 158). This topic is especially relevant because it 
brings to the forefront the issue of vulnerability. The disruption of bodily 
certainty (during illness, for example) renders apparent the contingency 
and fallibility of trust in one’s own body. Unlike the fragility of trust in other 
people, with its acceptance of the vulnerability to exposure to others who 
can potentially cause damage, the fragility of bodily trust renders apparent 
the vulnerability resulting from being dependent on a living organic body. 
In this sense, corporal doubt that lies at the center of illness experience 
manifests the vulnerability of the exposure to organic life.  
At this point it becomes evident that there is a tension in Carel’s 
interpretation of bodily doubt. One the one hand, illness shows that relative 
to one’s own body there is a bodily feeling grounded on the animal nature 
of human beings. More specifically, the fragility of bodily trust shows one’s 
dependence on transient, feeble organic structures (CAREL, 2014, pp. 146, 
162). On the other hand, the loss of continuity which presents itself in bodily 
doubt is described by a dynamics in which the body changes from being 
ready-to-hand into a present-at-hand uncanny entity (CAREL, 2014, p. 156). 
The use of Heideggerian terminology shows that this dynamics is being 
interpreted through the distinction between the mode of being of subsistent 
things (Vorhandenheit) and the mode of being of tools (Zuhandenheit). The 
tension consists in conceiving the body as both a tool that can brake and an 
living organism which can become incapable. Thus, the ontology of tools 
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central aspect of the illness experience. That tension can be resolved by 
focusing on the relation between bodily trust and existence. But this results 
in an interpretation of illness uncanniness that does not refer to the notion 
of broken-tool and that entails a more robust ontological commitment.    
4. Bodily trust and modalities 
A relevant aspect of the analysis of bodily doubt is the identification of 
a conditioning between the feeling of bodily trust and existential feelings 
(RATCLIFFE, 2008 e 2015). Havi Carel (2014, pp. 147-148) suggests that the 
feeling of bodily trust is a necessary constituent of existential feelings. This 
entails that there would be some kind or degree of bodily trust (or distrust) 
at all levels of existential feelings. This suggestion not only acknowledges 
that bodily feelings can be complex – by being made up of other bodily 
feelings – but also points out bodily trust as a constant element in varying 
existential feelings. On the basis of changes in situational specificity and 
conceptual impregnation, four levels of existential feelings have been 
singled out: pure existential feelings, feelings of basic familiarity and 
security, more specific existential feelings, and emotional feelings in mood-
like variations (SLABY & STEPHAN, 2008). One may conjecture whether 
bodily trust and doubt are situated at the level of pure existential feelings, 
insofar as feelings that are reflective of the basic bodily functioning are 
located at that level.   
According to Ratcliffe, there are general traits that justify qualifying that 
set of feelings as existential: they are pre-intentional background feelings 
that structure experience and they are bodily feelings. Existential feelings 
are pre-intentional because they make up a basic condition for adopting 
varying intentional attitudes. Bodily trust also has this pre-intentional role 
in the making of experience. Hence, one can understand how the disruption 
of bodily trust affects the meaningfulness of experience as such. More 
precisely, existential feelings play the role of intentional constitution insofar 
as they provide access not only to instances but also to kinds of possibilities 
(RATCLIFFE, 2015, p. 51). With those feelings, the general scope of what is 
possible opens up in a determinate way. This is exactly one of the 
phenomenological qualities of bodily trust: the feelings of possibility, 
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may say that bodily trust has the quality of “I can” (CAREL 2014, pp. 148 e 
150). 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to present a detailed analysis of the 
kinds of modal properties belonging to the space of possibilities of 
existential feelings. It would be fitting, for example, to verify whether the 
notion of agentive modalities (MAIER, 2015) has the required form for an 
elucidation of the modal space at the primary level of trust in potentialities, 
abilities, and skills of the body. Focusing the analysis on the possibilities 
specifically relating to the horizon of the “I can”, and remaining withing the 
phenomenological framework, I will interpret the modal space of bodily 
trust based on Heidegger’s (1983) ontological elucidation of living 
organisms. 
Although Heidegger’s interpretation of organic life does not take into 
account the developments in the biological sciences that led to the new 
Darwinian synthesis and to population thinking, it does have in its favor 
two hermeneutic guidelines, which are based on the theories of Hans 
Driesch, Jakob v. Uexküll, and Hans Spemann. First, animal and plant 
organisms are understood holistically and ecologically. On the one hand, 
organs cannot be considered abstractly, but need to be elucidated on the 
basis of its connections into systems and organic unities as totalities. On the 
other hand, organic unities are intrinsically relational, that is, their 
determination is not restricted to the boundaries of bodily surfaces, but 
extends into the environment and environmental relations. Second, living 
organisms are not understood at their most basic level as being sets of state-
properties or processes, but as units of modal qualities. In other words, 
organisms are not primarily systems of organs and their functions, but units 
of capabilities (Fähigkeiten) organized by their fundamental aptitude to 
engage with an environment (HEIDEGGER, 1983, pp. 374-375). 
While elucidating bodily trust as a feeling of trust in organic 
capabilities, it is important to highlight two results of Heidegger’s 
differential analysis in the comparison between tools and organs. 
Strikingly, the difference is pointed out exactly in the context that suggests 
an analogy between tools and organs: their relation to a function or a goal 
(REIS, 2012). Unlike tools, organs do not have goals or utilities; rather, it is 
the capabilities that have organs and mold them. This means that the organs 
are wholly dependent on organic capabilities, even at the level of embryo 
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Unlike tools, which need external actions to be put into use and to fulfill 
their goals, organs are always regulated so that they constantly meet their 
functional goals. More precisely: even when they are at rest or atrophy, 
organs are ruled by the capabilities. The outcome of this analysis is that 
organs and tools are ontologically diverse, i.e., the kinds of possibilities 
offered by organs and tools are not subsets of a larger kind of modal 
property (HEIDEGGER, 1983, §§ 52 e 53). 
An important point that allows us to visualize this difference is what 
Heidegger (1983, § 54) describes as the dimensional framework of organic 
capabilities. Capabilities have the organs at their service. This means that in 
embryo development and in environmental engagement it happens a 
passage through a dimension in a formal sense. A specifically organic 
dimension is one in which the rules situated at the capabilities anticipate 
the environmental space where the encounter with something capable of 
uninhibiting the drives can happen. Unlike an impulse or a force, the drive 
(Trieb) that is entailed by the dynamics of the capabilities has a self-
regulation that accounts for some plasticity in the onto-genetic process and 
in environmental interactions (REIS, 2018). Also, this means that in the 
drives there is a determining element of the environments and of the 
environmental items that can trigger the capabilities. This result, which has 
been linked to the theories of niche construction (ENGELLAND, 2015), 
entails that the organic aptitudes are in part accountable for the formation 
of environments and of various kinds of spaces in which the organism’s 
environmental interactions unfold (SKOCZ, 2004). Hence, it also becomes 
apparent that any analogy between organisms and machines, or organs and 
tools, is in principle ruled out. 
Based on this ontology, the modal space of bodily trust can be described 
as a unity of capabilities, that is, a dimension of living possibilities. 
Considering the generality of bodily trust, one may conclude that the space 
of possibilities of existential feelings is made up by a categorial complexity, 
which integrates existential and organic possibilities. A consequence of this 
ontology of life for the analysis of the feeling of trust is that bodily doubt 
does not manifest the body as a broken-tool, but rather the living space of 
organic capabilities. Therefore, existential feelings have an element that 
refers to the scope of possibilities that are neither existential nor merely 
useful, but proper to organic life. The dynamics of the losses that make up 
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itself as a physical body, but the disruptive emergence of a living organic 
body. I will now examine how this ontological commitment found in the 
analysis of bodily trust (and of existential feelings in general) reveals itself 
more complex.  
5. Ways of being and generality in the phenomenology of illness 
In the critical literature it has been objected that the ontological 
commitments entailed by the notion of existential feeling are not explicitly 
acknowledged. Vagueness in the descriptions and lack of a shared 
ontological and epistemological framework would be preventing an 
understanding of the nature of existential feelings. This point would be 
evident in the issues concerning the alleged object-less and non-conceptual 
nature of that kind of feelings (MANZOTTI, 2012; SAARINEN, 2018). If we 
narrow the focus of analysis to the level of the feelings of bodily trust and 
doubt, then the modal elucidation mentioned earlier offers an opportunity 
for making things more explicit. Bodily trust means trust in one’s own body 
as a living organism, that is, in the unity of organic capabilities. On this 
approach, the ontological commitment is not primarily to objects, states of 
affairs, or processes, but to a specific set of modal properties. The felt 
possibilities in bodily trust are dimensional capabilities endowed with an 
internal regulation and relation to the environment. They are living 
possibilities that are intertwined with the complex modal space opened up 
by existential possibilities.  
If one pushes forward in the exploration of this ontological 
commitment, eventually one reaches a meta-ontological level. In keeping 
with the Heideggerian interpretative matrix of animal and plant life, the 
organism as a unit of living possibilities and capabilities is not just a class 
of entities in an ontological framework along with other categories of 
entities. More basically, the term ‘organism’ designates a fundamental way 
of being (HEIDEGGER, 1983, p. 342). Hence, organic life does not make up 
a category within the same way of being of other categories of entities, tools, 
physical objects, etc., but is an independent way of being.  
Ontological pluralism, the view that there is more than one way of 
being, has been presented in terms of quantifier variance. Based on van 
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of existence has taken on a major role in the elucidation of the concept of 
being. Given that the usual meanings of ‘existing’ are made explicit by the 
existential quantifier of first order predicate logic, accepting modes of being 
means admitting more than one elite existential quantifier with non-
overlapping domains (SPENCER, 2012, p. 911). In this sense, the debate 
around the interpretation of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology as a kind 
of ontological pluralism has focused on explaining ways of being as 
properties (TEPLEY, 2014), natural kinds (KELLY, 2014), or kinds of 
existence (McDANIEL, 2009). Elsewhere I have laid out my arguments 
against those views (REIS, 2017), and put forth a broader notion of way of 
being based on the concept of constitution condition (CERBONE, 1999). In 
this sense, ways of being are dimensions which contain normative clauses 
for individuation, determination, phenomenal manifestation, and 
existence.  
It has been widely acknowledged that the illness experience conveys a 
high epistemic potential, since its elucidation reveals structural features of 
human embodiment, action, and experience in general. This is especially 
evident in the cases of bodily doubt and trust. However, those feelings are 
also epistemically relevant for singling out a commitment to an ontology of 
ways of being and kinds of modal properties. The interpretation of the 
illness experience leads us to the level of an ontological pluralism with a 
rather unusual commitment, namely, that the same entity, a human person, 
may share two ways of being: those of organic life and historical existence. 
Such a view would entail not only that an entity might exist in more than 
one way (McDANIEL, 2009, pp. 313-314), but also that the same entity 
would have a mixed way of determination and individuation. Bodily doubt 
gives access to the unity of intentional existence and organic life constituted 
by capabilities. It remains an open problem how that unity of ways of being, 
if it is consistent, is to be elucidated.  
Yet, there is a set of additional traits entailed by the ontological 
pluralism of life and existence. Ways of being contain determination 
clauses. Hence, generality relations are entailed by the ways of being. It is 
not artificial to assume that different ways of being entail different forms of 
generality. In this sense, a theory of forms of generality was put forth by 
Anton Ford (2011) aiming at an elucidation of the form of generality 
underlying the canonical analysis of the theory of action. Ford lays out three 





ILLNESS AND GENERALITY 
 
 185 
ANALYTICA, Rio de Janeiro, vol 22 nº 2, 2018, p. 174-191 
https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.2018.v22i2.174-191 
generality – and shows that it is impossible to reduce categorial and 
essential generality to the standard form of accidental generality. As with 
the theory of action, one may ask which form of generality is exemplified at 
the level of the ways of being of organic life and historical existence. 
This problem has been answered independently. Nate Zuckermann 
(2015) argued forcefully that the specifications in the way of being of 
historical existence are of a categorial kind. Ford (2011, pp. 11 e 89; 2008, p. 
22, n. 9; p. 26) and Thompson (2008, chap. 2) suggest that organic life 
exemplifies categorial generality relations. If this is the case, the 
consequences are not trivial, insofar as categorial generality exhibits a 
logical structure that is quite unlike that of the relations between accidental 
genera and species. In accidental generality, it is perfectly possible to offer 
a real definition of a categorial species in terms of accidental genus and the 
concept of a differentiating property. The resulting definition is not circular, 
given the logical independence of the specific difference relative to the 
accidental genus and species. With categorial generality one observes 
another behavior: There is no differentiating concept that is logically 
independent of the categorial species. Furthermore, this differentiating 
concept cannot be external to the categorial genus. Hence, the whole 
definition of categorial species is circular.   
This form of generality has been explicitly analysed since Brentano, and 
is known as the determinable-determinate relation (JOHNSON, 1921; 
PRIOR, 1949; CHISHOLM, 1987; FUNKHAUSER ,2006). Phenomena that 
display the categorial form of generality are known as dimensions of 
difference, for example, differences by degrees. However, this form of 
generality is not limited to dimensions that have varying degrees. What the 
definitional behavior in categorial generality shows is two basic traits. The 
investigation of categorial species cannot go on referring to the above-
mentioned concepts of categorial genus and differentiating property. 
Epistemology has to shift in the dimensions that have categorial generality. 
Also, the logical dependence of the differentiating notion relative to 
categorial genus and species shows an ontological priority. The categorial 
species is more basic than the genus, i.e. something belongs to a categorial 
genus because it belongs to a categorial species. Together, these traits entail 
that knowledge of a categorial genus happens through the elucidation of 
privileged examples that show the differences and variations in the 
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Evidently, the conceptual and expressive resources needed to 
investigate the dimensions of categorial generality also show a heterodox 
behavior. Nate Zuckermann (2015, pp. 508-510), for example, insists that the 
formal-indicative methodology sketched by Heidegger is precisely the 
adequate conceptual apparatus for an elucidation of historical existence. 
Examining this topic goes beyond the scope of this paper. But it is worth 
mentioning that if bodily doubt shows itself in the conspicuous unity of the 
ways of being that have categorial generality, then the phenomenology of 
illness needs to conform to the ensuing requirements of an exemplarist 
epistemology and of a metaphysical priority of categorial species over 
categorial genus. On the other hand, the phenomenological attitude in 
which first-person experience intertwines with responsiveness to what 
others have to say (CROWELL 2018) seems to be suitable for the 
development of the conceptual arsenal demanded by such structures.  
6. Conclusion 
Discussing the interpretation of the core of the illness experience as 
being that of the dysappearance of a broken-tool, I have laid out an 
approach to bodily doubt based on a framework that includes modal 
ontological pluralism and a theory of forms of generality. The feeling of 
bodily doubt displays a dynamic unity of ways of being determined by 
modal properties and structured by categorial generality. Warsop (2011, pp. 
493-494) correctly points out that the uncanniness in illness refers to the 
presence of organic life in human existence and to the intimation of 
mortality presented by a fragile and finite body. One may add that an aspect 
of that uncanniness is due to a peculiar unity of ways of being that enjoy 
categorial generality. There is ambivalence in the fact that there is life in the 
life of meaning. Thus, the ineffability that the experience of bodily doubt 
may have is not due solely to the disruption in the background context of 
meaning. It may well come about from categorial generality belonging to 
both organic life and historical existence.  
I conclude by mentioning three directions for further investigation. 
First, there is the problem of analyzing the various contexts in which 
categorial generality is exemplified in the illness phenomenon. Modal 
properties, as well as the levels and the components of existential feelings 
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the question of identifying the consequences of an ontological pluralism in 
which the way of being of life is elucidated in modal and dimensional terms 
for the so-called lived body-living body problem (THOMPSON, 2007, pp. 
235-237; FUCHS, 2009, p. 223; 2018, p. 83 e 211). Third, there is the problem 
of working out an exemplarist methodology that provides the expressive 
means required by the illness experience in dimensions of categorial 
generality. Would the epistemic injustice in illness (CAREL & KIDD, 2014; 
KIDD & CAREL, 2017) be rooted in an embodied existence that has 
categorial generality? If so, then a phenomenology of illness endowed with 
a more complex epistemological and ontological framework might be 
instructive for those who have been the experts – often under hermeneutic 
injustice – at discerning the uncanny zones of the ineffable: the suffering ill 
persons. 
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RESUMO 
A fenomenologia aplicada à enfermidade promoveu a elaboração do paradigma do corpo 
vivido, que tem sido frutífero na análise de estruturas da experiência da doença. Um 
resultado central da análise é a elucidação do conceito de enfermidade em termos de uma 
sintonia (Stimmung) do estranhamento (Unheimlichkeit) que é correspondente à 
ruptura na unidade do corpo vivido. A pessoa enferma situa-se numa atmosfera de 
estranhamento em relação ao corpo próprio, que aparece de forma análoga a um utensílio 
quebrado. Neste artigo problematizo a analogia com o utensílio quebrado, concentrando-
me no exame do fenômeno da dúvida corporal. Minha sugestão é que a explicitação da teoria 
de categorias implicada na fenomenologia da dúvida corporal conduz a um pluralismo de 
modos de ser em que o tipo correspondente de generalidade impede a interpretação da 
experiência da enfermidade como a manifestação de um utensílio quebrado. Como 
conclusão, a presente análise é consistente com a interpretação da enfermidade como sendo 
a atmosfera do estranhamento, que é interpretado aqui como a disrupção na unidade de dois 
modos de ser: existência e vida. 




Applied phenomenology of illness elaborated the paradigm of living body, which has been 
successful in the analysis of the structures of the experience of disease. One of the main 
results of this analysis is the elucidation of the concept of illness in terms of an attunement 
(Stimmung) of the uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit) that is relative to a disruption in the 
unity of the living body. The ill person finds herself in an atmosphere of uncanniness in 
relation to her own body, which appears analogously to a broken tool. In this paper, I 
question the analogy with the broken tool, focusing in the examination of the phenomenon 
of bodily doubt. My suggestion is that the explicitation of the theory of categories implied 
in the phenomenology of bodily doubt leads to a pluralism of modes of being in which the 
corresponding type of generality precludes the interpretation of the experience of illness as 
the salience of a broken tool. As a result, this analysis remains consistent with the 
interpretation of illness as the atmosphere of uncanniness, which is presented here as the 
disruption in the unity of two ways of being: existence and life. 
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